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Abstract 
In this article, I trace lines of materialist pedagogies in the history of women 
workers’education following feminist interpretations of Spinoza’s assemblage of joyful 
affects. More particularly, I focus on the notions of laetitia [joy], gaudium 
[gladness] and hilaritas [cheerfulness] as entanglements of joy and trace their 
expression in practices and discourses inscribed in archival documents that I have 
reassembled around the theme of women workers’ education. My reading of Ethics 
follows a range of feminist thinkers that have engaged with Spinoza’s ‘ethics of 
joy’ in education and beyond. The article draws on extensive archival work with 
personal auto/biographical documents and public essays of women 
workers/educators/writers in Paris and New York that span the period between 1830 
and 1950. What I argue is that it is the experience of creative and radical education 
that has created a platform for workers to re-imagine themselves in the world with 
others. 
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Providence was kind and led my feet to a Summer School in Bangor, North 
Wales, organised by the W.E.A in conjunction with the Extra-Mural department 
of Manchester University […] The various seminars were small but spirited; the 
tutors understanding and encouraging […] It was a strange joy to browse over 
the niceties of Bishop Blougram’s Apology or to delve into the intricacies of The 
Ring and the Book […] It was a month of almost complete happiness; a pinnacle 
of joy never to be quite reached again. (Foley, 1973, pp. 91, 92) 
 
In the last two pages of her autobiography, A Bolton Childhood (1973), 
British labour activist Alice Foley chose memories of joy and happiness 
of her first summer school in workers’education to conclude the account 
of her early life. Her text forcefully expresses entanglements between 
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 ethics, aesthetics and politics in women workers’ lives. As I have shown 
elsewhere (Tamboukou, 2017), Foley’s educational experience makes 
connections with a wider international network, the movement for 
workers’ education that was catalytic in the history of the labour 
movement, as well as women’s position within it, and made radical 
interventions in the economic, social and cultural formations of the 
twentieth century. 
Focusing on Foley’s joyful experiences of education, in this article, I 
follow lines of feminist materialist pedagogies through Spinoza’s 
philosophical assemblage of joyful affects. More particularly, I look at 
the notions of joy [laetitia],1 cheerfulness [hilaritas], pleasure 
[titillation] and gladness [gaudium] and I trace their material and 
corporeal expressions in practices and discourses inscribed in‘documents 
of life’ (Plummer, 2001) that I have reassembled around the theme of 
women workers’ education. My reading of Ethics follows Lloyd’s excellent 
study (1996), as well as a range of feminist thinkers who have engaged 
with Spinoza’s ‘ethics of joy’ in education and beyond (see Gatens, 
2009). I argue that the experience of radical education has created a 
platform for women workers to re-imagine themselves in the world with 
others. The article unfolds in two parts: (a) first, I reread the Ethics, 
focusing on ideas and concepts that are most relevant to feminist neo-
materialist approaches to education2; (b) then I look at how such 
concepts, fleshed out in women workers’ narratives, can map a new 
plane of educational praxis. By way of conclusion, I consider education 
as a component of Spinoza’s take on freedom within current concerns 
and debates in educational studies. 
 
Thinking with Spinoza 
 
Because human bodies are capable of a great many things, there is no doubt but 
what they can be of such a nature that they are related to minds, which have a 
great knowledge of themselves […] but for a clearer understanding of these 
things, we must note here that we live in continuous change, and that as we 
change for the better or worse, we are called happy or unhappy […] In this life 
then, we strive especially that the infant’s body may change (as much as its 
nature allows and assists) into another, capable of a great many things and 
related to a mind very much conscious of itself, of God, and of things. [E VP39S] 
In commenting on Spinoza’s reflections on the joy of living a life of 
knowledge and understanding, Lloyd critically observes that, apart from 
the above extract in the fifth part of the Ethics, there is very little 
explicitly educational in Spinoza’s writings (1998, 157). Reflecting on the 
possibilities of bodies and minds to effectuate change, Spinoza 
implicitly refers to the educational actions that can change ‘the 
infant’s body’to a mind/body that understands the world and their 
position within it. What is particularly striking in this extract is the 
agonistic character of transformation: ‘we strive’ [conamur] Spinoza 
writes in relation to the whole process. I want to stay in this agonistic 
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 character of the educational process, as a transition to greater activity, 
particularly linking it to Dahlbeck’s (2015) suggestion of using insights 
from Spinoza’s philosophy to look at education as resistance, a process 
of guiding students towards the gradual formation of adequate ideas—
the Spinozist path to freedom par excellence. In the case of workers’ 
education, ‘resistance’ is always, already there, ipso facto, given the 
material and cultural conditions of its possibility. 
Spinoza’s idea of education as a joyful agonistic process brings in 
imagination, active affects, reason, the gradual formation of 
adequate ideas and ultimately intuitive understanding, as the highest 
level of knowledge, and therefore happiness, in the philosopher’s 
ethical universe. Joy as an educational experience takes different 
forms of expression when considered in the context of associations 
and ‘collective imaginings’ (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999). As Ruddick has 
noted from a Spinozistic perspective, there is a connection between 
joy and empowerment, in that ‘we organise encounters to maximise 
joy’ (2010, p. 22). In Spinoza’s philosophical universe, humans 
collaborate with one another to enhance their power for action; this is 
not suggested as a moral proposition—humans should collaborate—but 
as a matter of fact, an immanent process of how things work, changes 
happen and the world moves forward. Drawing on Spinoza’s theory of 
how bodies are in a continuous process of affecting and being affected, 
Gatens and Lloyd have argued that freedom is an ethicopolitical 
practice,‘a collective process of becoming-free’ (1999, p. 146). 
Moreover, possibilities for action are relational and emerge as the 
expression of affective and cogni- tive interrelations. In this context, 
students make the transition from the phase of understanding through 
forming adequate ideas to the experience of feeling joy, which 
eventually motivates the Spinozistic scientific intuition of getting to 
know the world and their relation to it. This process of knowledge-in-
becoming, as I will call it, is further linked to the expression and 
enactment of political discourses and practices, a powerful assemblage 
in workers’ education that emerged through the struggles of the 
labour movement and had social change at its heart. 
We can therefore see that although ‘education’ is not explicit in 
Spinoza’s plane of thought, it is nevertheless closely connected to 
its dominant philosophical themes as identified by Lloyd: ‘the unity 
of a reality which nonetheless undergoes a myriad of transformations; 
the dynamic character of bodies, minds and ideas; the 
transformation of emotions through understanding them’ (1996, p. 
4). Imagination is crucial in all of these themes and takes a central 
role in the attempt to think about education through Spinozistic lenses. 
Let us then consider imagination first, as initiating the process of 
knowledge-in-becoming. 
Imagination has been widely discussed as an ambiguous concept in the 
rich body of literature around Spinoza’s Ethics, but it is at the heart of 
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 his philosophical thought, as clearly and succinctly captured in the 
opening proposition of Part IV of the Ethics: ‘Nothing positive which a 
false idea has is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it is 
true’ [E, IVP1]. As a rationalist philosopher, Spinoza is cautious about 
the ‘errors’ of imagination but he does not dismiss it as irrelevant to 
epistemological enquiries. In his view, imagination is an ineradicable 
component of human life and of knowledge itself and shapes the way 
he views the world, subjects and their interrelation. According to Lloyd, 
it is precisely Spinoza’s take on imagination that makes connections 
with educational discourses and practices: 
 
It is in his thoughts on imagination—its hazards and its enormous potentials for 
ethical pedagogy in relation to both individual and social life—that we find 
what can be mostly fruitfully appropriated from his philosophy for rethinking 
educational objectives and practices in the present. (1998, p. 157) 
 
Reason and imagination are not incompatible in Spinoza’s philosophy. As 
Lloyd pithily notes, ‘fictitious or “feigned” ideas are mixed methods of 
knowing. They partake of imagining, but through being criticised by 
reason they become a source of improved understanding’ (1996, p. 61). 
This is because Spinoza’s take on imagination emerges from the 
immanent connections between minds and bodies, as well as his 
famous treatment of the mind as an idea of the body: ‘the object of the 
idea constituting the human mind is the body. Or a certain mode of 
extension which actually exists, and nothing else’ [E IIP13]. 
Negri (1991) has particularly focused on the ‘savage power’ of 
imagination in knowledge formations, as well as in the constitution of 
the real: ‘imaginative knowledge experiences the affections of the 
body, of exteriority, of duration, with the intensity that follows 
phenomenologically from them’ (1991, p. 80). In this light, 
 
imagination becomes something more than a source of error, to be 
transcended […] Reason can criticise those fictions, replacing them with 
better ones. The goal is not to transcend and spurn imagination, but to 
complement it and collaborate with it. (Lloyd, 1996, p. 63) 
 
Imagination thus remains in Spinoza’s epistemological toolbox and 
Etienne Balibar has argued that ‘in reality all men are in both the world 
of imagination and that of reason [even when they have] acquired 
many true ideas through science and philosophy’ (1998, pp. 109, 110). 
In Balibar’s interpretation, the mind never operates in abstraction, 
but always in reference to the body of which it is the idea and thus it is 
always entangled in the bodily affects and passions. Moreover, 
bodies/minds never act in isolation. When we join forces by coming 
together as associations or collectivities, we enhance our power as 
embodied and embedded individuals and we are more prone to be 
 4 
 affected by joy. In this light, perfec- tion for Spinoza should not be 
taken as individualistic, but is rather a process of becoming active and 
autonomous through closer association and friendship with others 
(Balibar, 1997, pp. 24, 25). Balibar’s influential reading of Spinoza has 
brought forward transindividuality as a particularly important way of 
theorising subjectivity. Understood as ‘the mutual constitution of 
individuality and collectivity’ (Read, 2015), transindividuality is a 
useful concept to theorise the emergence of ‘the subject of 
education’ through Spinozistic lenses, particularly so within the 
agonistic context of workers’ education. 
It is therefore ‘in the social dimensions of Spinoza’s version of 
imagination that we can find the most illuminating applications of his 
philosophy to education and social critique’ (Lloyd, 1998; p. 160). Grassi 
has further argued that the Spinozistic process of working through 
affect, a process engaged by the act of imagining, is a way of getting 
into the essence of what it is to live, and it is thus central in self-
understanding and self-determination (2009, p. 148). Grassi’s pithy 
observation makes a powerful link to joy, the Spinozistic active affect 
par excellence and a crucial component in the process of knowledge-in-
becoming. 
It is in Part III of the Ethics that Spinoza brings imagination and 
passions together in considering ‘human actions and appetites’ (E 
IIIPREF). Passions are included in the geometric order of the Ethics and 
in the Definitions Spinoza marks an important difference between 
‘affections’ [affectio] and ‘affects’ [affectus]: 
 
By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting 
is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas 
of these affections. 
Therefore, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these affections, I understand 
by the affect an action, other- wise, a passion. [E IIID3] 
 
Deleuze has pointed to the fallacy of simply assigning affection [affectio] 
to the body and affect [affectus] to the mind: ‘The affectio refers to a 
state of the affected body and implies the presence of the affecting 
body, whereas the affectus refers to the passage from one state to 
another’ (1988, p. 49). In Deleuze’s understanding, affections are 
associated with images and affects with feelings: ‘there is a difference 
in nature between the image affections or ideas and the feeling 
affects, although the feeling affects may be presented as a particular 
type of ideas or affections’ (1988, p. 49). 
Affects in Spinoza’s framework can be active or passive, Lloyd has 
commented (1996, p. 73), while joy is ‘the passion by which the mind 
passes to a greater perfection’ [E IIIP11S]. Joy is thus tightly 
interwoven with the crucial concept of conatus as the essence of all 
beings—humans and non-humans. Lloyd has further noted that 
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 although joy is one of the three primary affects in the geometrical 
exposition of desire [cupiditas], joy [laetitia] and sadness [tristitia], 
it is not perceived as a single concept, but rather as an entanglement 
of active affects, including cheerfulness [hilaritas] and gladness 
[gaudium], amongst others (1996, p. 90). Looking closely at the 
entanglements of joy, Lloyd has explained that gladness 
‘accompanies a thing’s distinctive pleasures’ (1996, p. 90), while 
cheerfulness ‘is a pleasure of reflection [that] arises from the mind’s 
capacity to hold the fragments of consciousness together in a whole 
not confined to the present’ (p. 90). Cheerfulness is ‘a higher order of 
joy’: it unfolds within a durée and‘it is more easily conceived than 
observed’[E IVP44S]. Given the distinctiveness of cheerfulness and its 
relation to eternity, it is no wonder that Spinoza expands on this 
concept in part four of the Ethics, which is about ‘human bondage’ 
and the power of affects to restrain, but also to enable the 
mind/body assemblage to make the transition from bondage to 
freedom—the topic of the fifth part. Cheerfulness as a component 
in the assemblage of joy is thus most tightly related to reason and 
knowledge. 
‘We act only insofar as we understand’(E IVP24D), Spinoza has famously 
written. Greater understanding gives subjects an increased sense of 
feeling their power and this empowering process also enacts a new 
source of joy. Drawing on the circular relation between joy, 
empowerment and action, Rorty (1987) has made a useful distinction 
between individuation and individuality in how we configure the role 
of reason, knowledge and understanding in Spinoza’s philosophical 
universe. According to Rorty’s interpretation, forming adequate ideas 
of our passions and the world is a process that gradually erases 
differences between individuals: individuation diminishes as humans 
act together in agreement. It is the same process of reasoning that 
increases their individuality however, as they gradually realise their 
power of acting and persevering; that is, their individual conatus. 
In the light of the above, Gatens has suggested that ‘one can read 
the Ethics as a philosophy of power that offers a fluid and immanent 
ethics of joyful and life enhancing encounters’ (2009, p. 202). Aloni 
has further focused on happiness as crucial for a Spinozist liberating 
and empowered pedagogy (2008, p. 533). Although Spinoza celebrates 
sensual pleasures and material happiness, however, it is ‘intellectual 
love’ that makes the difference in his Ethics, a point that leads to the 
consideration of his tripartite articulation of knowledge. 
Spinoza’s view of knowledge includes imagination, reason and 
intuition: ‘Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity, 
whereas knowledge of the second and of the third kind is necessarily 
true’ [E, IIP41]. As imagination encompasses ‘knowledge from random 
experience’ [E, IIP40S2], it can only form inadequate and confused 
ideas. It is only in the second kind of knowledge that the mind can 
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 have ‘common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things’ 
[E, IIP40S2]. It is the assemblage of such ‘common notions’ that 
Spinoza defines as ‘reason’, but in this second order of knowledge the 
world is still perceived in terms of ‘ontologically discrete categories’ 
(Donovan, 2009, p. 175). It is only when we have made the transition 
to the third order of knowledge that we reach the level of ‘intuitive 
knowledge’, which ‘proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal 
essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the 
essence of things’ [E, IIP40S2]. In Lloyd’s succinct summary: 
 
The first way of knowing is focused on singular things, but is inherently 
inadequate. The second is inherently ade- quate, but unable to grasp the 
essence of singular things. The third and highest kind of knowledge is 
inherently adequate and able to understand singular things. (1996, p. 67) 
 
It is precisely the entangled relationship between these three levels 
of knowledge that has triggered controversial interpretations: (a) the 
traditional Hegelian route of Spinoza’s strict rationalism and (b) a 
more complex view of the relations between imagination and reason 
that Antonio Negri has initially proposed, with Lloyd, Gatens and 
Balibar following it, amongst others. What is particularly interesting, 
however, in Spinoza’s tripartite system of knowledge is how affects 
are forcefully interwoven in his epistemology. As Donovan has 
commented, 
 
Spinoza believes that we attain higher levels of knowledge and joy by 
understanding the adequate causes of ideas and by having a body that is 
productively engaged in the world. The higher our level of knowledge and 
affectivity, the greater our joy. (2009, p. 177) 
 
The body is crucial here as ‘the ground of human action’ and as 
Donovan has further suggested: ‘the mind is constituted by the 
affirmation of the actual existence of the body, and reason is active 
and embodied, precisely because it is the affirmation of a particular 
bodily existence’ (2009, p. 179, original emphasis). Perceived beyond 
the mind/body dichotomy, reason emerges in its splendid materiality 
and situatedness, always within the second level of knowledge. 
Moreover, since Spinoza has argued that a political body is always an 
effect of its citizens’ lived experience, we can extrapolate this to an 
educational community and argue in parallel that the ‘body’ is always 
dependent on the educational subjects’ corporeal and affective 
experiences. This is where Gatens and Lloyd’s notion of ‘collective 
imaginings’ (1999) becomes so pertinent, particularly in relation to 
workers’ education. 
 
Educating the imagination: The movement for workers’ education 
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I have very few experiences of the joys of childhood or the games of the early 
years. From the time I learned to read, reading became my only occupation and 
the charm of all moments. I felt a vague desire to experience and know 
everything […] Still too young to grasp my social position, I was happy […] but these 
flattering dreams would soon faint. The necessity of work, made me understand 
that deprived of wealth, I had to renounce knowledge, happiness, I resigned to 
myself. 3 
In this moving section from her Profession of Faith, a rich and powerful 
text sent to the Saint-Simonian newspaper, the Globe, around 1832, 
Jeanne Deroin (1805–1894) forcefully expressed her love and pas- sion 
for knowledge, as well as her disappointment about not being able to 
get an education. Deroin was born and brought up in Paris as a 
proletarian girl. She worked as a seamstress to earn her living, but she 
eventually became a self-taught worker intellectual. Through her 
involvement in the romantic socialist movements of nineteenth-century 
Europe, she realised her dream of becoming a teacher and a journalist. 
As Deroin’s early testament reveals, education has always been a 
project and a dream at the heart of many workers’ lives, both men and 
women, from the beginning of industrialisation. I have written 
elsewhere about the history, practices and discourses of this movement 
(see Tamboukou, 2017), but what I want to do in this section is discuss 
how it was saturated by joyful affects. 
Deroin’s autobiographical reference to education fleshes out the 
assemblage of desire/reason/imag- ination that I discussed above. It 
also very much highlights the agonistic character of the educational 
transformation as expressed in Spinoza’s rare reference to education in 
the fifth part of the Ethics [E VP39S]. In writing her Profession of Faith 
and bravely presenting it to the intellectuals of the Saint- Simonian 
community, Deroin not only showed the power of imagination in 
motivating a proletarian girl to educate herself, but also revealed that 
the transformation to perfection is an ongoing process, a knowledge-in-
becoming. Moreover, it was through her immersion in the utopian 
collectivities of nine- teenth-century France that Deroin realised her 
dream of getting an education and thus increased her power to act. As 
Gatens has suggested, ‘Spinoza’s political writings allow us to think 
about human relations […] in terms of sociabilities and communities […] 
while his developmental account of knowl- edge implies not only 
different ways of knowing but also corresponding ways of being’ (2009, 
p. 189). 
 
Marie-Reine Guindorf (1812–1836), a self-educated seamstress, who 
worked alongside Deroin in the editorial collective of the first 
autonomous feminist newspaper in France, wrote about the power of 
associations: 
 
As they say most often, nothing dies, but everything is transformed; this is a proof 
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 that the order of the future will be to draw upon association. At this moment 
human beings of all parts associate to make their opinions prevail; we women 
should also spread our ideas to make people understand that our EQUALITY with the 
man, far from lowering them, as some seem to believe, will be on the contrary a 
pledge of happiness for all.4 
 
While working hard during the day, Guindorf joined the Association of 
People’s Education and devoted her free time in the evenings to the 
education of ‘the daughters of the people’ (see Tamboukou, 2015). 
What is beautifully articulated in her article is the power of 
association in congealing moments of change, joy and happiness in the 
flow of educational and political transformation. Human striving for 
Spinoza involves its association with other bodies since it is through 
such entanglements with others that one’s power is increased and joyful 
bodies emerge. In this light, Deleuze has suggested that reason in 
Spinoza’s plane of thought is ‘the effort to organise encounters on the 
basis of perceived agreements and disagreements’ (1990, p. 280) and it 
is precisely this effort that leads to associations. As Spinoza writes in 
his Theologico-Political Treatise: ‘men are not born to be citizens but 
are made so’ (TP V61). Gatens has further remarked that through 
Spinozist lenses human freedom is only possible within a civil society 
and it is thus ‘a collective endeavour’ (2009, p. 194); it is about 
understanding our situation ‘and on the basis of such understanding, to 
act to maximise our power and our joys’. (p. 195) But in order for 
freedom to become a feasible project, the state, according to Spinoza, 
should create at least two fundamental conditions of possibility: a 
political climate of pluralism and tolerance and an education system 
that could help people navigate through the three levels of knowledge 
outlined in the Ethics. Spinoza’s theory of knowledge has initiated a line 
of progressive pedagogical thinkers such as A. S. Neill, John Dewey and 
Bertrand Russell, amongst others (see Aloni, 2008, p. 539). Here I am 
particularly interested in Spinoza’s influence upon Dewey’s thought 
since he was a central figure in the movement for workers’ education 
in the US, particularly as he kept highlighting joy, vitality and 
happiness as central aims of a humanist and progressive educator. His 
notion of ‘creative imagination’ mobilised discourses that underpinned 
the philosophy, vision, curricula and practices of workers’ education. 
This radical education movement was mainly organised, run and 
sustained by women workers, like Fannia Mary Cohn (1885–1962), who 
served the educational department of the International Ladies’ Garment 
Workers’ Union (ILGWU) for almost 50 years (1918–1962). Cohn was deeply 
interested in the power of creative imagination to open up the dark side 
of things, reveal hidden meanings and remake the world anew (see 
Tamboukou, 2017). It was in the context of such ideas that she was in 
correspondence with 
Dewy and often invited him to give lectures at the workers’ university in New 
York. 
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 In their auto/biographical writings, women workers have variously 
expressed moments of joy, happi- ness and bliss experienced while 
attending classes and summer schools. Enjoyment was indeed at the 
heart of women workers’ education, as a movement aiming ‘to develop 
a desire for study as a means of understanding and of enjoyment in 
life’ (Smith, 1929, p. 7). This ‘ethic of joy’ (Lloyd, 1996) sprang from an 
assemblage of ‘materialist pedagogies’ (Hollis, 2004) that I now want to 
map on the plane of Spinoza’s joyful affects. 
In writing about her experiences at the Bryn Mawr school for women 
workers in the industry, Rose Pesotta (1896–1965), an anarchist labour 
organiser, remembered the beautiful campus: ‘most of our classes are 
held under shady green trees on beautifully kept lawns’, she wrote 
(1987[1944], pp. 15, 16). The pleasures of nature came hand in hand 
with new knowledge and understandings about labour economics, 
social and political history, as well as art education. Literature, poetry 
and drama were indeed crucial in workers’ education, but were 
organically entangled with the theoretical and science strands of their 
curriculum. Indeed, an important aspect of the Bryn Mawr pedagogy 
was a thematic and interdisciplinary approach to teaching and 
learning, with courses that were drawing on themes, questions and 
problems relevant to the students’ needs, interests and experiences, 
rather than driven by strict disciplinary boundaries or contents. 
Hollis (2004, p. 22) has given a very succinct example of how this 
pedagogy worked. Supposing the chosen topic was wage determination 
in textile mills: an economic analysis would show how profit is 
generated by explicating and discussing various theories of value; a 
historical study would explore how wages had evolved in the US or 
European industry; and finally creative writing might be employed to 
allow students express and reflect upon their own experiences. What 
is particularly notable about the Bryn Mawr pedagogical practices is 
that in grappling with the women workers’ academic deficiencies, the 
faculty tutors found a valuable alternative by drawing on the richness of 
students’ lived experiences as a departure point for the discussion and 
analysis of social and economic issues. The following state- ment from 
Jeanne Paul, a Bryn Mawr student, powerfully shows why ‘an 
intelligent understanding of life’ was so important for women workers: 
 
Literature means to me the key to realms of beauty, dreams and fantasies […] 
Sometimes, in the land of Poetry, I would meet with glorious sunsets, exquisite 
flowers, singing birds, storms on sea and on land […] Sometimes in the land of 
Novels, I would see strange peoples, witness struggles between heart and mind 
[…] My possessing this magic key somewhat made up for my dull world.5 
 
Jeanne Paul’s account of what literature meant to her beautifully 
expresses the power of imagination in allowing the subject of 
education to run away from the monotony of working life. Her 
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 imaginative leap to ‘the strange lands’ of Poetry and Novels was a 
phase in the process of transforming herself through learning. As 
already noted above, ‘fictions give access to adequate ideas without 
being themselves adequate’ (Lloyd, 1996, p. 61). In this light, Jeanne 
Paul’s imaginary travels helped her rework her lived experiences, see 
them in a different light and ultimately understand the source of her 
anxiety and dis- content. We need to remember here that 
understanding is crucial in the transformation of emotions for 
Spinoza, but it is also at the heart of his conceptualisation of politics: 
‘I have taken great care not to deride, bewail, or execrate human 
actions, but to understand them’ [PT I4] he wrote in his Political 
Treatise. It is in the process of understanding the drudgeries of her 
life that Jeanne Paul educates herself in the history and economics 
of the labour movement and this new way of seeing herself in the 
world with others elates and excites her. As already noted in the 
previous section, joyful affects are entangled with cognitive 
understanding and the power to reason as they enhance the subject 
of education to act, rather than being acted upon. This possibility of 
action is central in Spinoza’s idea of freedom: ‘That thing is called free 
which exists from the necessity of its nature alone and is determined 
to act by itself alone’ [E ID7]. 
Bryn Mawr students have vividly expressed gladness [gaudium] in 
reflecting upon moments in their education when they realised that 
they could understand labour economics and could therefore see why 
they were exploited and, most importantly, how they could resist. This 
is how Carmen Lucia remembers the day she understood the notion of 
economy, commodity and selling one’s labour. As she talks with a 
friend in front of the camera, for the Bryn Mawr documentary film 
‘Women of Summer’, her face beams: 
 
Did you ever have Amy Hews in the classroom? Do you remember the morning she 
said ‘how many of you think that the laundry is a factory?’We all were stunned: 
‘Well the laundry is not a factory, all they do is wash clothes’[…] but she insisted 
[…] it finally turned out, sure, I am selling my labour …‘oh, she said, you mean you 
are a commodity?’ Then we got the first inkling of what economy and what 
social problem means [sic] when you sell your labour, that’s when the question 
of the union came in.6 
 
Lucia’s face beams with gladness when she connects the 
understanding of selling one’s labour with the necessity of resistance 
through trade unionism, her personal road to freedom, as it unfolds in 
her memories. Women workers’ auto/biographical documents 
became important literary tools through which they rewrote 
themselves in discourse and culture. Moreover, the beauty of the Bryn 
Mawr campus made them cheerful and this active affect of hilaritas 
inspired them to be involved in the Workers’ Theatre Movement, which 
was at its heyday in the first half of the twentieth century (see 
 11 
 Samuel, MacColl, & Cosgrove, 1985). The archives of the Bryn Mawr 
summer school and the ILGWU’s educational archive include a rich 
range of photographs that carry visual traces of the students’ 
hilaritas, most forcefully expressed in the plays they wrote, directed 
and acted in (see Tamboukou, 2017). 
The joy of education made forceful connections with the playfulness 
of the drama genre. Here it is important to note that an important 
trait of the workers’ theatre, as compared with mainstream drama 
performances, was the blurring of the distinctions between 
‘spectators’ and ‘actors’, creating a milieu of participation that left a 
long-lasting impression upon the Bryn Mawr student, Victoria Grala. 
Her account of the ‘technique’ used to mingle actors and audience 
brings forward the importance of the pedagogies of theatre education 
as a joyful corporeal practice of forming and reforming collectivities: 
 
A unique and somewhat startling technique which was used over and over again 
in our drama this summer, was that of actors speaking from different parts of 
the audience … We discovered that an emotional feeling of unity resulted from 
such drama. (in Hollis, 2004, p. 96) 
 
James (2011) has looked at the question of how communities can make 
the transition between imagin- ing and reasoning, thus attaining the 
second kind of knowledge in Spinoza’s tripartite system. Focusing on 
this transition is particularly relevant to questions and issues arising 
from workers’ education, since this was a cultural movement 
springing from industrial communities and political associations. We 
could see this working in the materialist pedagogies deployed in 
women workers’ education and particularly in how the workers’ rich 
experiences in the industry were counterposed with their initial lack 
of academic background. 
 
Education as a process of becoming free 
In looking at marginalised histories and narratives in this article, I have 
made connections between Spinoza’s ethic of joy and his tripartite 
system of knowledge within the assemblage of women workers’ 
education. Drawing on Spinoza’s ideas about the capacity of bodies to 
undergo changes and to increase their power to understand and to act 
through affective encounters, I have shown how feminist materialist 
pedagogies played a catalytic role in providing material, spatial and 
intellectual platforms that sustained and supported processes of 
preservation, affirmation and continuous transformation. Education has 
been mapped as an agonistic plane wherein imagination, reason, 
understanding and joy are entangled in the process of becoming free. 
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza has been particularly influential in this 
context. Theorising Spinoza’s conatus, Deleuze has brought forward 
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 the idea of becoming rather than being free: ‘man is not born free, 
but becomes free or frees himself’ (1988, p. 70). It is this process of 
becoming free, through feeling, imagining, understanding and acting, 
that the deployment of feminist materialist pedagogies has 
facilitated. Through being transferred to ‘different spaces’ and ‘other 
times’, women workers were temporarily released from real life 
worries, obligations and constraints and were inspired to think and act 
differently. Their lived experiences became the material basis of their 
educational adventure; theoretical abstractions were discarded in 
favour of grounded understandings and situated knowledge; creative 
educational practices encouraged them to re-imagine and indeed 
reposition themselves in the world with others; active affects 
followed the formation of adequate ideas and women workers ‘took 
possession of their power of acting’, to paraphrase Deleuze (1988, p. 
70). Freedom for women workers was not a state to be attained, but 
rather an adventure, an experiment in life, a process of becoming 
through understanding, action and affective encounters. 
Affect in education is a highly discussed theme in contemporary 
debates, but it is also sadly becoming a faraway planet in relation to 
educational praxis. As educators and/or students, we are instead 
encouraged to think about the politics and economics of emotions, with 
emotional intelligence becoming a frightfully dangerous educational 
discourse (see Tamboukou, 2003). Spinozist insights in educational 
philosophy and praxis can thus contribute to current neo-materialist 
pedagogies and post-humanist approaches in an attempt to 
reconceptualise education as an open process of feeling the world and 
becoming free. 
 
Notes 
1. It has to be noted here that laetitia has been translated as pleasure, by Boyle 
(Spinoza, 2002) and Shirley (Spinoza, 1982), as well as elation by Rorty (2009) 
and there is a vibrant debate around translating Spinoza’s affects/emotions 
[affectuum]—a debated translation in itself. 
2. For an overview of the burgeoning literature in this field see amongst others 
Taylor & Hughes, 2016, as well as two special issues in the journal Gender and 
Education, ‘Material Feminisms, New Directions in Education’ (Vol. 25, 2013-Issue 
6) and ‘Shifting education’s philosophical imaginaries: relations, affects, bodies, 
materialities’ (Vol. 28, 2016-Issue 2). 
3. Bibliothèque Nationale de France/ Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal/ Fonds Enfantin ou 
Fonds Saint-Simonien/ MS7608/ Correspondance du Globe (Dames)/ Deroin 
(Mme)/ Profession de foi/22 (1–44), (BnF/BdA/FE/MS7608/CdG/ Deroin/22). 
Also, transcribed in Riot-Sarcey 1992, 128. 
4. Tribune des Femmes-La Femme Nouvelle, 1(15), 198–199, April, 1833 [all emphases in the 
original]. 
5. Jeanne Paul, ‘What literature means to me’, Bryn Mawr Light, 1926 (in Hollis, 2004, pp. 149, 
150). 
6. Carmen Lucia, a Bryn Mawr students talking in the film ‘Women of Summer’ (Heller 
& Bauman 1985). Availble on line: 
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 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9hOiOreS8ZQ [Part I, 14.06–14.45 m]. 
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